How the Unification Church Is Treated Abroad — and Why Japan Became the “Exception”

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For decades in Japan, the Unification Church was often described in vague, harmless-sounding terms:
“a religious group we don’t really understand,” or “just a few lawmakers with personal ties.”

When people raised concerns, the response was frequently to minimize:
“It’s not a big deal,” “It has no real influence.”
Those words halted scrutiny, lowered public vigilance—and in the end,
became a pass that allowed the organization to reach deep into the political core.

A country kept saying “it has no influence,” and then woke up to find that it did.
This is not a religious debate.
It is a political failure: Japan did not treat a risk as a risk.

Abroad, the picture has long been different.
Across Western reporting, South Korean coverage, research institutions, and public documents,
the Unification Church has repeatedly been recorded as a
“cult-like organization” or a “socially controversial group”.

After the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
international media asked the same question, again and again:
“Why was this allowed to continue for so long in Japan?”

Their focus is not the legitimacy of faith, nor personal belief.
What is being questioned is Japan’s political and democratic structure—
a system that failed to process a problem as a problem.

This article organizes how the Unification Church has been treated abroad,
how it has been investigated or constrained,
and why Japan alone became the “exception”—by making the contrast visible.

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1. How the Unification Church Is Treated Overseas

Outside Japan, the Unification Church is commonly discussed using several overlapping categories:

• cult
• high-control group
• controversial religious organization

What is important is that these labels are not applied simply because a group is unfamiliar or unpopular. Overseas, the central concern is consistently behavior and structure, not belief itself.

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Criteria Used Overseas to Identify “Cult-like” Groups

In Europe and North America, groups are more likely to be described as cults or high-control organizations when certain patterns are observed. The Unification Church has frequently been discussed in relation to these criteria.

• Psychological control (high control)
Fear, guilt, and narratives of salvation or punishment are used to shape behavior. Members are encouraged to view personal suffering as proof of faith. As a result, individuals may appear to act voluntarily, while their decision-making capacity is substantially constrained.

• Financial exploitation
Donations and purchases are framed as conditions of faith or spiritual reward. In extreme cases, this leads to financial ruin and the collapse of family life. Overseas, this is treated not as a religious matter, but as an exploitative economic structure.

• Family rupture
External criticism is reframed as persecution or hostility. Family members who oppose involvement are portrayed as obstacles to salvation. This dynamic often results in long-term estrangement and intergenerational harm.

• Organizational opacity
Even when registered as a religious body, complex layers of affiliated organizations are used. From the outside, financial flows and decision-making structures are difficult to trace, reducing transparency and accountability.

• Political penetration
This is the point that receives particular attention overseas. When a group invokes “freedom of religion” while simultaneously mobilizing voters, cultivating personal networks, or providing political services, the issue shifts from religion to democratic security.

At this stage, the concern is no longer belief, but whether democratic processes are being distorted or captured.

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Overseas “Red Lines” Are Surprisingly Simple

From an international perspective, the basic red lines are surprisingly clear. Freedom of belief is protected, but structures of exploitation and control are not.

The key question is not what a group claims to believe, but what it does: how it recruits people, how it raises money, and how it affects society at large.

Japan’s Critical Difference: “Where to Stop”

In many countries, once these warning signs appear, authorities do not wait for large-scale damage to occur. Oversight, regulation, and political distancing are applied at an early stage.

This is why overseas reporting often describes the Unification Church not simply as a “religious group,” but as a social risk that must be structurally contained.

Japan stands out precisely because this point of intervention was missing. Under the banners of “religion” and “freedom of belief,” political engagement and organizational expansion were allowed to continue without effective restraint.

From an overseas perspective, the issue is not “the Unification Church problem” itself. The real question is why, despite mounting warning signs, Japan failed to draw a clear line and stop it.

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2. Was the Unification Church criminally pursued abroad?

Yes. In multiple countries, the organization has been treated not merely as “controversial,”
but as a subject of investigation, litigation, and surveillance.

This is not “states cracking down on religion.”
The focus is consistent: conduct—fraudulent solicitation, undue influence, coercive control,
opaque money flows, and political penetration.

What tends to trigger criminal cases abroad

• Fraud: Using deception, exaggeration, or fear-based narratives
  to induce people to hand over money or property.
• Undue influence: Exploiting weakened judgment or vulnerability
  in order to distort a person’s decision-making.
• Psychological coercion: Binding individuals through guilt,
  fear, or salvation narratives that restrict free choice.
• Opaque money flows: Concealing real financial activity
  by rotating front organizations, names, and events.
• Political penetration: Entering the political sphere
  through mobilization, networks, and votes.

In many countries, these factors are treated not as “religious issues,”
but as matters of public safety and consumer protection,
particularly when fraud or undue influence is involved.

France: a culture of treating cult harm as public safety

France tends to treat cult harm as a public safety and social protection issue.
Even where “religion” is invoked, once the structure resembles fraud, exploitation,
or coercive control, it falls within the orbit of legal intervention.
The key is: religion is not allowed to function as an immunity label.

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United States: even religion doesn’t excuse illegality

The U.S. strongly protects religious freedom, but it also operates on a clear premise:
illegal conduct remains illegal.
The focus tends to be on misconduct—fraudulent fundraising, tax abuse, or deception—
rather than theological content.

And because political conflict is open and adversarial,
ties between politicians and controversial groups can quickly become a major liability.
In practice, this often pressures political actors to distance themselves.

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Germany: Monitored as a “Democratic Risk” Before Criminal Thresholds

In Germany, the line for criminal prosecution is not the only benchmark.
When there are indications of ideological manipulation or activities that may undermine democratic order,
organizations can be monitored under frameworks designed to protect democracy itself.

The logic is not “wait until concrete harm is proven,”
but intervene once a structural risk to society becomes visible.
From this perspective, being labeled a “cult-like organization” does not automatically require criminal conviction;
it can already justify survei

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South Korea: Treated as a “Social Problem” in the Founding Country

South Korea, the founding country of the Unification Church,
shares certain historical and social contexts with Japan, including Cold War legacies.
Even so, the public and institutional treatment of the organization has diverged significantly.

In South Korea, the Unification Church has long been widely recognized
as a socially problematic religious organization,
closely associated with concrete harms such as family breakdown,
aggressive fundraising, and the disruption of individuals’ lives.

As a result, regardless of whether criminal charges are ultimately brought,
criticism from the media, civil society, and public discourse has been persistent.
Political proximity to such an organization is therefore seen as
a serious political risk, rather than a neutral or manageable association.

Crucially, South Korean debates tend to draw a clearer distinction between
freedom of religion and harm and exploitation.
Religious belief itself is protected,
but once structural harm becomes visible,
there is a shared understanding that politics should keep its distance.

This has led to a political environment in which,
if a controversial organization attempts to approach political actors,
questions are immediately raised:
“Why are you involved with them at all?”
“Can you explain the risk this relationship entails?”

From an international perspective, this makes Japan’s situation appear particularly puzzling.
Even in the founding country, political distance has largely been maintained.
Why, then, did Japan’s governing core remain entangled for so long?
This question is repeatedly raised in foreign coverage.

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Summary: Abroad, the Focus Is “Harm Structures,” Not “Religion”

In summary, international perspectives do not treat religious status as a shield.
The prevailing view is not “religion must not be touched,”
but rather religion does not exempt an organization from scrutiny
when harmful structures are present.

This is where Japan’s situation appears most “exceptional.”
In Japan, even as harm accumulated,
the criminal gate remained narrow,
political accountability remained weak,
and relationships were repeatedly minimized as “having little influence.”

Abroad, the guiding principle is often:
stop it before victims accumulate.
In Japan, the pattern was closer to:
“even when victims appear, it does not stop.”

That difference defines what foreign media describe as
Japan’s exceptional vulnerability.

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3. Why Was It Not Criminally Prosecuted in Japan?

In Japan, even as harm accumulated over time,
cases that developed into full criminal prosecution remained limited.
Many were instead handled through civil litigation.

This “civil-only” pattern does not simply mean that victims were passive
or that wrongdoing was absent.
Rather, multiple structural factors combined to keep
the criminal gate effectively closed.

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① Harm is absorbed into “personal responsibility”

Harm caused by coercive fundraising or psychological pressure
is far less visible than violent crime.
In Japan, such cases were often reframed as:
“Why didn’t they walk away?”
“Isn’t this freedom of belief?”

As a result, victims were pushed into a narrative of
self-choice and self-responsibility.
But in reality, many cases involved psychological constraints,
fear-based narratives, and manipulation that distorted free decision-making.

The more this framing prevailed,
the farther criminal accountability moved out of reach.

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② The harm appears in forms that are difficult to prosecute

Criminal prosecution requires clear proof:
who did what, when, how, and with what intent.
However, coercive fundraising and undue influence tend to involve:

• private, one-on-one persuasion rather than public acts
• long-term psychological pressure rather than a single incident
• fragmented organizational structures and multiple front groups
• money flows that are difficult to trace in a unified manner

Because of these characteristics,
cases are more likely to be channeled into
civil lawsuits aimed at financial recovery,
rather than criminal trials focused on punishment.
This reinforces the “civil-only” handling of harm.

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③ “Religion” as a Label Dulled Administrative and Social Judgment

In Japan, references to “freedom of religion” have often surfaced at the forefront whenever problems related to religious organizations are raised. This caution is not inherently wrong. Protecting belief is a core democratic principle.

However, in practice, this framing has frequently functioned as a brake on scrutiny. Once an issue is categorized as “religion,” concrete harms—such as coercive fundraising or psychological manipulation— tend to be treated as difficult to judge rather than necessary to confront.

By contrast, in many Western systems, belief itself is protected while exploitation and harm are regulated. Where that distinction is weak, the label “religion” becomes a shield that blunts administrative and social judgment.

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④ The Decisive Factor: Politics Kept the “Gate” Closed

The most critical factor lies here. The Unification Church did not exist merely as a religious organization; through mobilization, personal networks, and affiliated groups, it became politically useful.

Once the issue began to be framed not as “organizational harm,” but as something that could affect politics itself, responses shifted toward minimization. In Japan, the dominant explanation became “there was no organizational involvement” or “these were only individual cases.”

This reframing pushed responsibility away from political structures and onto individuals. As a result, the threshold for criminal or administrative intervention remained high. The political system effectively kept the gate to accountability closed.

Criminalization would have required acknowledging that harm was systematically produced and publicly tolerated. That, in turn, would have demanded political responsibility. This linkage is precisely what was avoided.

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⑤ Result: Civil Illegality Appears, but the Structure Remains

In Japan’s civil court system, illegality can be recognized. However, civil remedies are fundamentally individual. Even when plaintiffs prevail case by case, the underlying structure is rarely dismantled.

Organizations can adapt: changing names, altering fronts, shifting channels. In this sense, civil litigation alone cannot function as prevention. It compensates victims, but it does not stop recurrence.

The accumulation of such cases reflects a social cost produced by relying on civil remedies to handle systemic harm. It is the price paid for avoiding earlier intervention.

In sum, the reason Japan did not pursue criminal cases cannot be reduced to legal technicalities. It was the outcome of social assumptions, blurred responsibility, and a political decision not to open the gate.

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4. Comparing the Different Treatment of Aum Shinrikyo and the Unification Church

From an international perspective, one aspect appears particularly puzzling: the stark difference in how Aum Shinrikyo and the Unification Church were treated.

This is not a question of “which was worse.” What is being examined is what the state and society define as “danger”.

Category	Aum Shinrikyo	Unification Church
Nature of harm	Indiscriminate violence and killings	Non-violent but structural exploitation (donations, family destruction)
Criminal response	Raids and severe punishment	Primarily civil cases; criminal prosecution limited
Distance from politics	Complete isolation	Long-term contact often tolerated
Social evaluation	Immediately classified as a “dangerous organization”	Often softened as a “religious group”

The critical point is this: violence triggers immediate exclusion, while non-violent, structural harm is more easily normalized.

In Japan, this weakness became especially pronounced. Visible violence was recognized as an urgent threat, while long-term, non-violent exploitation remained harder to define as “danger” and was therefore allowed to persist.

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Why Violence Is Immediately Punished While “Exploitation” Is Tolerated

Aum Shinrikyo used visible, indiscriminate violence that directly threatened society. As a result, the response was swift and decisive: compulsory investigations, arrests, and organizational dismantling. This reaction was both expected and justified.

By contrast, the harm caused by the Unification Church was largely non-violent and structural. Through psychological pressure and economic exploitation, it inflicted damage on families and individual lives in ways that were not immediately visible.

Because this harm was harder to see, it was also harder to classify as a criminal matter. Instead, it was often reframed as a question of personal choice: “Why didn’t they leave?” “Why didn’t the family stop them?”

In effect, Japan developed a pattern in which violence was treated as an urgent threat to be eliminated, while life-destroying exploitation was left to individuals to endure. This asymmetry persisted for decades.

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When “Religion” Became a Functional Immunity

Aum Shinrikyo was quickly labeled a “dangerous organization,” and society responded accordingly. The Unification Church, however, was consistently framed as a “religion.”

Once the label of religion was applied, scrutiny tended to soften. Under the banner of protecting freedom of belief, exploitation and coercive practices were treated as difficult to judge or hard to intervene in.

Freedom of religion must, of course, be protected. But it does not justify exploitation or control. In many Western systems, this distinction is made explicitly. In Japan, however, that boundary remained blurred.

As a result, the label “religion” functioned as a practical immunity, shielding harmful structures from decisive intervention.

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The Decisive Difference: Whether There Is Political Contact

Aum Shinrikyo was politically useless—and therefore isolated. Once recognized as a threat, it was completely cut off from politics.

The Unification Church, by contrast, was politically useful. Through electoral mobilization, personal networks, and affiliated organizations, it provided tangible benefits to political actors.

Once such utility existed, the problem could no longer be treated as merely “religious.” It became a matter that affected the political system itself. At that point, responsibility was repeatedly shifted away from institutions and onto individuals.

Criminal prosecution would have required acknowledging that harm had been structurally produced and publicly tolerated. That acknowledgment would, in turn, have demanded political accountability. This is precisely where the process stalled.

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What This Comparison Ultimately Shows

What this comparison demonstrates is not that “Aum was dangerous and the Unification Church was not.”

Rather, it reveals how Japanese society failed to recognize non-violent but structural harm as a threat to democracy itself.

The critical issue was not religion, but the fact that exploitation embedded within political structures was allowed to persist. That is why foreign media frame the Unification Church issue not as a religious scandal, but as a failure in the operation of Japan’s democracy.

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5. Are There Countries Where Religious Groups Engage in Politics?

In short, yes—there are countries where religious groups attempt to engage with politics. However, what makes Japan distinctive is not the mere existence of such contact, but the fact that these relationships became deeply entrenched, normalized, and allowed to persist over long periods of time.

Internationally, it is not unusual for religious organizations to approach political actors. What differs is what happens next.

In many countries, once a relationship begins to resemble dependency or undue influence, strong pushback tends to emerge from media, civil society, and political institutions themselves.

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United States: Contact Exists, but Dependency Is Hard to Sustain

In the United States, it is relatively common for religious groups to engage in political events or lobbying activities. Such contact, in itself, is not considered unusual.

However, when a group becomes controversial, proximity to political power quickly turns into a liability. Media scrutiny, opposition attacks, and pressure from civil society intensify.

Politicians are repeatedly asked: “Why are you associated with this group?” “Can you explain the risks of maintaining this relationship?”

As a result, political actors often find it difficult to sustain close ties with organizations that are widely perceived as problematic. Maintaining distance becomes a rational political choice.

In this sense, while religious groups may exert influence, the threshold for tolerating problematic organizations is comparatively low. Political dependency on such groups is institutionally and socially difficult to maintain.

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Korea: Strong Public Rejection Makes Political Entanglement Risky

In South Korea, the Unification Church has long been recognized not merely as a religious organization, but as a social problem closely associated with family breakdown, excessive donations, and the destruction of individual lives.

As a result, political engagement with the group carries high reputational risk. Rather than gaining support, politicians risk losing public trust. The dominant calculation is not “what benefits does this relationship bring,” but “what risks does this association create.”

In Korea, political actors tend to prioritize distancing themselves from controversial groups over preserving religious neutrality. The emphasis is on preventing political damage before it occurs.

Crucially, this distancing often happens before criminal prosecution becomes necessary. Public pressure and media scrutiny function as an early brake on political proximity.

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Europe: Institutional Barriers Enable Early Intervention

In many European countries, including France and Germany, the legal and administrative frameworks for regulating cult-like groups are relatively well defined.

When psychological coercion, undue influence, or opaque financial practices are identified, organizations can be subjected to monitoring, administrative sanctions, or restrictions on political engagement.

This often occurs before such groups become deeply embedded in politics. Early intervention reduces the risk of long-term dependency or political capture.

European systems tend to draw a clearer line between protecting freedom of belief and preventing harm to democratic order. Religious status does not exempt organizations from scrutiny or regulation.

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Why Did Only Japan Fail to Stop It?

When viewed comparatively, the difference is stark. In many countries, public opinion, media scrutiny, and institutional safeguards act as brakes on excessive political entanglement with controversial religious groups.

In Japan, however, the Unification Church offered political utility: electoral mobilization, personal networks, and affiliated organizations. Over time, this utility became normalized.

Even as problems surfaced, responses were repeatedly softened by phrases such as “there was no organizational involvement” or “these were individual matters.” Responsibility was diffused, and decisive intervention was postponed.

From abroad, this is not understood as a difference in religious culture. It is seen as a failure of political and social systems to create effective stopping mechanisms.

This is why foreign media consistently ask: “Why did only Japan allow this relationship to persist for so long?”

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Japan’s case cannot be explained simply by saying that religion influenced politics. What stands out internationally is that a problematic relationship was allowed to harden, unchecked, at the center of the political system.

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6. How Foreign Media Describe Japan

A defining feature of foreign coverage is that it focuses less on individual politicians’ failures or isolated scandals, and more on structural conditions.

Rather than asking who failed or who was involved, foreign media consistently ask why the relationship persisted and why it was not stopped earlier.

Commonly used terms include:

• deep ties (long-standing relationships)
• long ignored (prolonged inaction)
• embedded in politics (structural political integration)
• systemic failure (institutional breakdown)

In short, foreign media consistently frame the issue around the question: “Why was this allowed to continue?” This differs sharply from domestic coverage, which tends to emphasize whether individuals were aware or at fault.

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What Foreign Media Treat as the “Main Actor”: Not the Unification Church, but Japan

In many foreign reports, the Unification Church itself is not the central subject. Instead, the focus is placed on Japan’s political system and democratic institutions.

The narrative is not “the Unification Church is problematic,” but rather, “why Japan failed to prevent the problem.”

This framing is reflected in headlines that emphasize “Japan’s blind spot,” “Japan’s political system,” or “Japan’s democracy,” rather than the name of the religious organization alone.

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Three Questions Foreign Media Repeatedly Ask

• Why was it ignored for so long?
  The issue is framed not as a sudden scandal, but as the result of prolonged inaction.
• Why did political accountability not emerge?
  Even after harm became visible, responsibility failed to translate into political consequences.
• Why was there no effective stopping mechanism?
  Civil remedies existed, but institutional intervention remained weak.

These questions are treated not as moral judgments, but as indicators of how democratic checks and balances function—or fail.

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Foreign Analysis: Not a “Scandal,” but a Test of State Capacity

Within Japan, the issue was often processed as a religious scandal or a matter of political impropriety. Abroad, this framing carries little weight.

What is being questioned is not individual morality, but the capacity of the state to respond to sustained, structural harm.

The central concern is not whether someone acted improperly, but whether democratic institutions were capable of intervention once harm became evident.

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“Japan’s Uniqueness” as Seen from Abroad: A Structure Where Accountability Does Not Activate

From an external perspective, Japan’s case is difficult to understand precisely because responsibility failed to materialize even after harm was widely recognized.

In many countries, once the relationship between politics and a problematic organization becomes visible, some form of accountability is triggered.

In Japan, however, explanations such as “we did not know” or “this was a personal matter” repeatedly absorbed responsibility. Political action did not follow.

As a result, foreign media conclude that Japan’s defining issue is not religion, but the absence of effective mechanisms to halt harmful political entanglements.

This is why the issue is ultimately framed not as a matter of faith or religious culture, but as a question of whether democratic safeguards are functioning.

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7. What Foreign Media Headlines Reveal About “Japan’s Uniqueness”

In foreign coverage, headlines frequently emphasize structures rather than individual wrongdoing. When the Unification Church appears in headlines, it is often framed through Japan’s political and institutional context, not as an isolated religious problem.

Below are representative headline patterns frequently found in foreign media, presented here with interpretive explanations.

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Headline ① “Long Ignored” — The Problem Is Not the Group, but Japan

Abe Killing Exposes Japan’s Long-Ignored Cult Problem

The key phrase here is long ignored. The focus is not the shocking nature of a single event, but the fact that the issue was allowed to persist for decades.

Rather than portraying the incident as an unexpected tragedy, the headline implies prolonged neglect. Responsibility is therefore placed not on the organization alone, but on Japan as a system that failed to act.

While Japanese headlines tend to gravitate toward motives, background, or individual culpability, foreign headlines emphasize the duration of inaction. The implied subject is not “the cult,” but Japan itself.

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Headline ② “Embedded” — From Individual Ties to Structural Integration

How a Cult Became Embedded in Japanese Politics

The term embedded is critical. It signals a condition that goes beyond individual relationships or personal connections.

To be embedded means that the organization became integrated into the political system itself. The problem, therefore, is not who met whom, but how political structures absorbed and sustained the relationship.

Foreign reporting consistently highlights this point: the issue lies in systemic integration, not in isolated acts of misconduct.

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Headline ③ “Blind Spot” — “We Didn’t Know” Is Not an Explanation

Japan’s Blind Spot: Politics and a Cult-like Organization

The phrase blind spot does not mean ignorance in a literal sense. It refers to something that is systematically overlooked.

In this framing, “we didn’t know” is not treated as a defense, but as evidence of a deeper structural failure. The question becomes why the system failed to see—or chose not to see— what was happening in plain sight.

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Headline ④ “Failed” — Responsibility Is Assigned to Politics

Why Japan Failed to Curb the Influence of a Religious Group

The decisive feature of this headline is that Japan is the grammatical subject. The verb failed assigns responsibility clearly.

The narrative is not that a religious group was powerful, but that political and institutional countermeasures did not function. This is framed as a failure of democratic governance, not as a religious controversy.

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What These Headlines Reveal About Foreign Perspectives

• The issue is not a sudden scandal, but prolonged neglect.
• The problem is not “religion,” but political embedding.
• “We didn’t know” is treated as a symptom, not an excuse.
• The conclusion points to a failure of democratic balance in Japan.

From abroad, what is labeled as “Japan’s uniqueness” is not the presence of a controversial religious group, but the fact that political accountability did not activate even after the problem became widely visible.

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8. How Foreign and Japanese Coverage Frame the Issue Differently

Foreign reporting tends to frame the issue around structure and systems, while Japanese coverage often centers on individuals and isolated incidents.

This is not a stylistic difference. It changes the nature of public debate and determines where responsibility is assigned.

Foreign Media	Japanese Media
Structural and institutional focus (“Why was it not stopped?”)	Personal and relational focus (“Who was involved?”)
Questions of democratic accountability	Scandal management
Long-term, systemic framing	Fragmented, case-by-case reporting

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Difference ①: Foreign Media Ask “Why Was It Not Stopped?” — Japan Asks “Who Was Connected?”

Foreign coverage is organized around the most fundamental question: why.

• Why was the problem ignored for decades?
• Why did political oversight fail?
• Why were institutional safeguards ineffective?

Japanese reporting, by contrast, often focuses on who did what: who attended which event, who exchanged greetings, or who appeared in which photograph.

As a result, foreign media move toward institutional responsibility, while Japanese media tend to conclude once individual involvement is clarified.

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Difference ②: Subject and Verb Determine Where Responsibility Falls

Foreign headlines frequently use constructions such as: “Japan failed,” “was long ignored,” “became embedded.”

In these formulations, Japan is the subject, and the verb assigns responsibility to the political system.

By contrast, Japanese headlines often place individuals as subjects, while verbs emphasize explanation, clarification, or apology. Responsibility is dispersed and rarely institutionalized.

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Difference ③: Three Factors That Disappear in Japanese Reporting

When coverage is framed around “who was involved”, three critical elements tend to disappear from Japanese reporting:

• ① Long-term accumulation (decades-long)
  What appears as a “sudden incident” is often the result of influence and relationships built up over many years. When attention stays on the immediate trigger, the long-term buildup of risk fades from view.
• ② Organizational structure and network mobilization
  Instead of examining networks linking politicians, affiliated groups, and individuals, reporting is reduced to isolated meetings, photographs, or personal exchanges. As a result, structural connections are fragmented and rendered invisible.
• ③ Political utility
  The crucial question—why the relationship was tolerated or politically useful for so long— is rarely pursued. Without examining incentives, accountability remains shallow.

When these three elements disappear, debate inevitably becomes superficial. Responsibility is reduced to individual blame, structural problems remain intact, and the same patterns quietly re-emerge under different names.

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Difference ④: Overseas Media Debate “Prevention,” Japan Debates “After-the-Fact Handling”

Overseas reporting focuses on a fundamental question: How could this have been prevented before harm occurred?

The emphasis is on democratic safeguards—monitoring, regulation, and political distancing— and how they should function before damage becomes irreversible.

By contrast, Japanese reporting tends to focus on explanations after the fact: who knew what, who failed to explain, and how responsibility should be processed or managed. This approach treats each case as an isolated incident, without building preventive barriers.

Without preventive frameworks, the same risks repeatedly resurface. Even if names or organizations change, the underlying structure remains.

From an overseas perspective, the issue is not a religious scandal. It is the failure of Japan’s political system to stop known risks in advance.

Ultimately, the difference in headlines reflects a difference in how societies assign responsibility— and in how democracies protect themselves from recurring structural harm.

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9. A Timeline Analysis Based on Foreign Reporting

Foreign reporting does not frame this issue as “an incident that suddenly occurred in Japan.” Instead, it is described as a structure that accumulated over time and was finally made visible by a triggering event.

In this narrative, the Abe assassination is not treated as the cause, but as the point at which long-standing problems became impossible to ignore.

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① Cold War Era: An Environment Where “Contact” Was Easily Normalized

During the Cold War, opposition to communism functioned as a central source of political legitimacy in Japan. Within this framework, groups that positioned themselves as anti-communist found it easier to gain access to politics and civic movements.

Foreign reporting often treats this period not merely as historical background, but as the origin of an atmosphere in which political proximity was rarely questioned.

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② Long-Term Accumulation: Electoral Mobilization and Human Networks

As time passed, relationships ceased to be occasional interactions and instead solidified into enduring networks.

Foreign media emphasize not isolated photographs or single meetings, but the long-term accumulation of electoral mobilization, affiliated groups, and personal connections.

Once such networks produce tangible benefits, the relationship shifts from ideological alignment to practical utility. At that point, severing ties becomes increasingly difficult.

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③ Domestic Constraint: Civil Illegality Accumulates, Politics Does Not Stop

In Japan, many cases involving coercive fundraising and financial harm were addressed through civil litigation. Court rulings accumulated, and illegality was recognized.

Yet political intervention did not follow. Foreign reporting highlights this disconnect: even as harm was acknowledged in court, political responsibility remained absent.

Responsibility was repeatedly absorbed into “individual cases” or “private matters,” making it difficult for structural intervention to occur.

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④ The Triggering Event: Foreign Media Re-examine the Structure

The assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was understood abroad as both a national shock and a moment of revelation.

Foreign coverage quickly shifted away from the perpetrator’s psychology and toward a broader question: why had this structure been allowed to persist for so long?

This marked the point at which long-ignored relationships were re-evaluated through a structural lens.

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⑤ The Present Debate: From “Whether There Was a Connection” to “How Democracy Can Be Repaired”

From a foreign perspective, the central issue today is no longer whether connections existed.

The question has shifted to how a democracy can restore its ability to halt harmful political entanglements.

This is why foreign analysis emphasizes prevention over scandal. Punishing individuals is not enough; unless structures are corrected, similar relationships will re-emerge under different names.

Accordingly, the issue is framed not as a religious controversy, but as a test of democratic resilience and governance.

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Conclusion

From an international perspective, the core issue has never been the Unification Church itself. What foreign observers have consistently questioned is a political structure in which responsibility failed to activate, even after harm became visible.

In other words, the problem was not simply that a controversial religious group existed, but that a political system allowed such a group to become embedded without effective intervention.

This was not a failure of faith, but a failure of governance.

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What Is “Japan’s Uniqueness”?

Japan’s uniqueness does not lie in religious culture. The distinctive feature is that harm accumulated, court rulings recognized illegality, and international warnings were issued— yet political intervention still did not occur.

The phrase “there was no influence” functioned as a stopping device. Investigation stalled, accountability was avoided, and the absence of visible consequences became normalized within politics.

This normalization is precisely what foreign media find difficult to understand.

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What Failed?

• The gate between civil illegality and political intervention was never opened.
  Even as civil court rulings accumulated, no mechanism existed to translate them into political action.
• Politics did not assume responsibility.
  Instead of addressing structural harm, responsibility was diffused and shifted onto individuals.
• “Self-responsibility” rhetoric neutralized accountability.
  The burden was placed on victims, and systemic correction was postponed.

This is not a religious issue. It is a failure in how democracy operates. This is why foreign media describe the situation as “Japan failed”— not as a moral judgment, but as an institutional diagnosis.

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Without Safeguards, the Pattern Will Repeat

Any group that approaches politics in pursuit of influence will adapt its name, structure, and tactics over time.

If the response remains limited to “investigate,” “explain,” and “close the case,” similar relationships will re-emerge under different forms.

What is required is not the exposure of individual wrongdoing, but the construction of democratic safeguards: clear boundaries, early intervention, and enforceable accountability.

From abroad, the conclusion is straightforward. The Abe assassination did not create the problem. It merely illuminated what had long been left unresolved.

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Finally: My take

The most piercing part of reading foreign coverage was not the Unification Church itself,
but how Japan is seen from the outside.

Cult-like groups exist in many countries.
Religion and politics sometimes approach each other.
Even so, once a problem is visible, many democracies distance themselves,
take responsibility, and cut off the structure.
That is “normal democracy.”

Japan was different.
Even after harm accumulated, even after court findings,
even after international alarms,
it was repeatedly settled with “we didn’t know” and “individual cases.”

Foreign media’s “Japan exception” is not about religious culture.
It is about a structure where politics does not stop,
and governments continue even when nobody takes responsibility.

This is not a past scandal.
It is a record of where Japan’s democracy broke,
where it abandoned repair,
and why the same structure will be reproduced under a new name
the moment we declare “it’s over.”
A country that never built a seawall has no reason to expect the next wave won’t come.