Japan’s New Framing of a Taiwan Contingency and How Taiwan Actually Sees It

As tensions continue in the Taiwan Strait, more attention is being paid to how the Japanese government positions a potential “Taiwan contingency.” On November 7, 2025, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in the Lower House Budget Committee that if Chinese naval vessels were to use force against Taiwan, the situation could fall under a “survival-threatening crisis,” which would open the way for Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense.

This remark triggered discussions on social media in Japan about where to draw the line between “defense” and “intervention.” It also reminded me of a post I wrote on X (formerly Twitter) on October 7. I wrote that post after watching how Taiwanese netizens reacted to the launch of the Takaichi administration. At that time, many conservative voices in Japan were strongly supportive of “Taiwan independence,” while quite a few Taiwanese users online were voicing doubts and caution toward such enthusiasm coming from outside Japan.

1. A New Step in the Government’s Position

In her Diet reply, Prime Minister Takaichi said that if China were to employ warships and actually use military force against Taiwan, that could constitute a case that becomes a survival-threatening situation. This was effectively the first time a Japanese administration spelled out a concrete scenario in which a Taiwan emergency could qualify for the most serious category under Japan’s security legislation.

She also mentioned that a range of cases must be considered — a naval blockade, cyberattacks, information operations — and that the government would make a comprehensive judgment based on the actual situation at the time. In other words, Tokyo is quietly widening the range of contingencies in which it could say “this concerns Japan’s survival.”

2. Taiwan’s Reality: A Majority Chooses the Status Quo

According to the June 2025 survey by the NCCU Election Study Center, the largest group of Taiwanese — about 34.6% — said they want to “maintain the status quo indefinitely,” and the second largest group — about 26.5% — said they want to “maintain the status quo and decide later.” In total, roughly 61% favor keeping things as they are.

By contrast, only around 2–3% supported “independence as soon as possible,” and those who want early unification with China are now an even smaller minority. For most people in Taiwan, choosing the status quo is not indecision — it is a rational choice for peace and survival amid constant pressure.

3. The Question of Japan’s “Defense” vs. “Intervention”

Inside Japan we often hear the phrase “a Taiwan emergency is a Japan emergency.” That framing is understandable in terms of geography and alliance politics, but it can also blur the boundary between legitimate self-defense and military involvement in someone else’s conflict.

• Legally: calling it a survival-threatening situation would allow collective self-defense and, depending on U.S. operations, could pull Japan into actual missions.
• Diplomatically: if Japan talks about intervention without fully reflecting Taiwan’s own diverse public opinion, it risks sounding as if it is deciding Taiwan’s future on Taiwan’s behalf.
• Socially: wrapping everything in the word “defense” makes discussions heated very quickly, leaving less room for calm, layered policy choices.

4. What a “Friendly” Approach Should Look Like

Many Taiwanese today are not looking for heroic rhetoric, but for ways to survive, de-escalate, and keep their society open. If Japan truly wishes to support Taiwan, the most useful contribution may be to help maintain a stable environment — diplomacy, dialogue, and regional frameworks — rather than pushing Taiwan toward confrontation.

Respecting Taiwan’s own preference for the status quo is, in that sense, a form of friendship.

Source: NCCU Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (1994–2025.06)