Trump Was the One Who Called: How the Xi–Trump Call Quietly Resets the U.S.–China Game — While Japan Risks Getting Out of Sync

The most consequential line about the recent phone call between President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping did not come from Beijing’s Foreign Ministry, nor from Trump’s own Truth Social post. It came, almost in passing, from U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on CNBC.

“To set the record straight, President Trump initiated the call.”

That statement is consistent with what China’s Foreign Ministry said earlier — that the call took place “at the request” of Washington. At the same time, some Western reports pointed out that the usual phrase “at the request of the U.S.” was missing from the written Chinese readout, a nuance that raised eyebrows among diplomats and China specialists.

In diplomatic practice, who places the call is not a trivial detail. It is widely read as a signal of initiative:

• The side that initiates the call is seen as taking the lead in setting the agenda.
• The side that receives the call is responding to someone else’s move.

By saying on air that Trump was the one who called, Bessent effectively anchored the narrative: in this round, it was Washington that reached out to Beijing.

■ Bessent’s “One-Year Pause” and Up to Four Leader Meetings

Bessent went further, characterizing the broader state of U.S.–China relations as follows:

“We have a one-year pause.”

To many observers, that sounds less like “things feel a bit better” and more like a deliberate attempt to move into a managed stability phase: not ending rivalry, but trying to contain escalation.

He then outlined a series of possible or planned meetings:

• A state visit by Trump to Beijing
• A state visit by Xi to the United States
• The G20 summit in Doral, Florida
• The APEC summit in Shenzhen

Taken together, that could mean up to four leader-level encounters in a single year. After several years of thin or highly tense contact, this looks very much like what some analysts have called a “re-engagement” between Washington and Beijing.

■ “We’re Always Going to Be Rivals, but There Are Things We Can Do Together”

Bessent summed up the new posture in one sentence:

“We’re always going to be rivals, but there are things we can do together.”

He then listed those “things we can do together”:

• Large-scale Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans (with multi-year volume commitments)
• Cooperation on stemming the flow of fentanyl precursors and other illicit narcotics
• Joint efforts — however limited — toward peace in Ukraine
• Stabilizing the global economy at a time of AI-driven investment and monetary uncertainty

From the vantage point of a U.S. Treasury Secretary, uncontrolled confrontation with China translates directly into market volatility, rate shocks and growth risks. It is therefore logical that Washington would seek a framework where it can compete hard on security and technology while preserving minimum cooperation on finance and trade.

■ Xi’s Historical Framing: Taiwan as Part of the WWII Settlement

The Washington Post highlighted another important layer: how Xi chose to frame Taiwan during the call.

According to the official Chinese readout, Xi told Trump that the “return” of Taiwan to China is an important part of the Allied victory in World War II.

This is straight from the long-standing Chinese Communist Party narrative: Taiwan is not just a current security issue, but part of the unfinished business of the post-war settlement. By casting Taiwan as a matter of “defending the fruits of victory” in WWII, Beijing is trying to elevate the issue from today’s geopolitics to historical legitimacy and international law.

The intended message to Washington is clear: if the United States cares about the post-war order it led, it should recognize Taiwan as part of that order — on Beijing’s terms.

■ A Tactical Win Over Japan? Beijing’s Narrative

The Post also framed the call as part of a broader diplomatic struggle involving Japan.

New Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has publicly suggested that Japan might become militarily involved if China attacked Taiwan and the United States intervened — a statement that goes far beyond Tokyo’s traditionally cautious language.

Beijing responded with what can fairly be called a full-spectrum pressure campaign:

• Harsh rhetorical attacks on Takaichi and her comments
• Heightened military signaling around Taiwan and Japan
• Economic coercion and implied tourism/business pressure

Within that context, Chinese political commentator Fred Gao described the Xi–Trump call as a tactical win for Beijing. His argument, as quoted by the Post, is that the call:

“drew Washington closer to Beijing and left Takaichi’s unilateral statements on Taiwan looking premature and strategically isolated.”

In Gao’s phrasing,

“Tokyo’s room for maneuver has been constrained.”

In other words, from his vantage point:

• Japan has locked itself into a hard-line narrative on China and Taiwan,
• while Washington is now visibly exploring a phase of stabilization with Beijing,
• which makes Japan look as if it is still playing by last decade’s script.

■ Takaichi “Ahead” of Washington on Taiwan

Gao’s assessment of Takaichi is blunt:

“Takaichi’s unilateral declarations on Taiwan now appear not just premature but strategically isolated — she has moved beyond where even Washington is willing to go.”

The core claim is not that Japan has no interests around Taiwan — it clearly does — but that:

• Takaichi’s rhetoric has moved beyond what Washington has formally committed to,
• and could, in effect, leave Japan carrying more visible risk than its main ally.

To be clear, this is a Chinese analyst’s reading, not an established fact. But the broader point matters: there is a widening gap between the way Japan narrates its China policy at home, and the way Japan’s position is perceived from Beijing, Washington, and beyond.

■ Washington’s Calculated Silence on Taiwan

On the U.S. side, what stands out is not just what was said, but what was left unsaid.

Trump’s public summary of the call described it as “very good” and stressed that “our relationship with China is extremely strong.” He mentioned Ukraine, fentanyl, and soybeans — but not Taiwan.

When Bessent was asked on CNBC about the U.S. position on Taiwan, he replied simply that it remained “unchanged,” and then moved on. He showed no desire to turn Taiwan into the headline issue of the call.

Read against the backdrop of the past decade, this looks less like oversight and more like intent: Washington appears to be trying to dial down the rhetorical centrality of Taiwan in the U.S.–China relationship, at least in public messaging.

■ Strategic Ambiguity and the U.S.–Japan Alliance

The Post also revisited a structural fact: the U.S.–Japan security treaty obliges the United States to defend Japan if it is attacked. But whether, and under what conditions, a war over Taiwan would trigger those obligations has been left deliberately vague.

This is the logic of “strategic ambiguity.”

For Washington:

• If it promises too clearly to defend Taiwan, it may provoke Beijing.
• If it signals too clearly that it will not, it may tempt Beijing into a catastrophic miscalculation.

That is why successive U.S. administrations have kept the specifics of a possible response to a Taiwan contingency deliberately opaque.

In Japan, however, political rhetoric has increasingly treated “a Taiwan contingency” and “automatic alliance activation” as almost synonymous. Takaichi’s comments sit at the far end of that trend. From Beijing — and perhaps from parts of Washington — Japan can look as if it is more publicly committed to confrontation than the United States itself.

■ What the Xi–Trump Call Reveals About Japan’s Strategic Risk

Putting Bessent’s remarks together with the Washington Post’s analysis and Chinese expert commentary, a tentative picture emerges:

For the U.S. and China:

• They are entering a “one-year pause” aimed at managing, rather than escalating, their rivalry.
• They are planning multiple leader meetings to stabilize the relationship.
• They see clear areas for cooperation — soybeans, fentanyl, Ukraine, macro stability.
• They are both wary of turning Taiwan into the central point of open confrontation right now.

For Japan:

• Its leadership has embraced a forward-leaning narrative on Taiwan, domestically popular in some circles.
• Yet Washington, Japan’s key ally, is visibly stepping back from an all-or-nothing confrontation frame with Beijing.
• That leaves Japan at risk of appearing to stand alone on the most exposed line of the chessboard.

None of this means that Japan’s concerns about Taiwan are illegitimate, nor that U.S.–China “stabilization” will last. But it does suggest that:

while Washington and Beijing cautiously explore a managed rivalry, Tokyo risks remaining locked in an older script of inevitable escalation.

■ Fact-Check and Caveats

This article is based on public information: the CNBC interview with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, official statements from China’s Foreign Ministry, and reporting and analysis from outlets including The Washington Post and Reuters.

Where it cites views from Chinese or Western analysts, those are presented explicitly as interpretations, not verified facts. Key questions — such as the full intent behind the wording of diplomatic readouts, or the private content of leader conversations — cannot be independently confirmed.

As U.S.–China–Japan dynamics continue to evolve, new reporting may clarify or challenge parts of this picture. Ongoing scrutiny and critical reading of all sides’ narratives remain essential.

■ Sources

• CNBC (U.S.): Official Transcript — Interview with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/25/cnbc-transcript-us-treasury-secretary-scott-bessent-speaks-with-cnbcs-squawk-box-today.html
• Washington Post: U.S.–China–Japan–Taiwan dispute analysis https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/11/25/us-china-japan-taiwan-dispute/
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (MFA): “President Xi Jinping Speaks with U.S. President Donald J. Trump on the Phone” (Nov 24, 2025) https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202511/t20251124_11759133.html