Part 1: Where Is Japan Heading?

How Overseas Observers Interpret the Takaichi Administration as a Shift from “Concern” to “Trajectory”

Prologue: Japan’s Warning Signs Are Turning Into a Trajectory

At first glance, the inauguration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi looks like a major turning point in Japanese politics.
But when you read what major international media and think tanks are saying, a different picture emerges:
their medium- to long-term view of Japan has hardly changed.

What has changed is not the direction, but the tone.

Before Takaichi: “Japan might be heading this way.”
After Takaichi: “Japan is now effectively on this path.”

A 2024 Pew Research survey shows that a majority of Japanese are dissatisfied with how democracy works in their country.
Long-ruling LDP governments, money scandals, and economic stagnation have produced a kind of chronic fatigue.
On top of that, a hardline leader with strong rhetoric has now appeared.

From abroad, this combination—
a tired democracy plus a hardline prime minister—
is the starting point for thinking about where Japan is heading.

In what follows, we summarize the main overseas narratives about Japan’s future along four axes:

• Democracy
• China, Taiwan and the U.S.–Japan alliance
• Economy and public finances
• Society and values

Chapter 1: Democracy Today — Liberal in Form, Illiberal in Substance

■ What “illiberal democracy” means (setting the terms)

When foreign political scientists discuss Japan, they almost always use the term
“illiberal democracy.”
In Japanese, this is often rendered as
「イリベラル民主主義（非自由主義的民主主義）」.

The idea itself is simple:

Elections remain, but the core “freedoms” of democracy—
free media, judicial independence, freedom of speech, and citizens’ rights—
gradually weaken.

Media grow closer to the ruling party, checks and balances erode, and nationalism becomes fuel for approval ratings.
This pattern of a “democracy with shrinking substance” is most often associated with Hungary and Poland.

Increasingly, Japan is being discussed as a country that is
moving closer to the Hungarian/Polish model of illiberal democracy.

■ 1-1 Growing dissatisfaction with democracy

According to Pew Research (2024), a
majority of Japanese say they are dissatisfied with how democracy works
in their country.

Foreign observers read this against several structural factors:

• long-term distrust toward the dominant LDP,
• a sense that “elections don’t really change anything,”
• deep social stagnation driven by aging and low growth.

In other words, the procedures of democracy remain in place,
but public confidence in its substance has been badly eroded.
The Takaichi administration stands on top of this already weakened foundation.

■ 1-2 A weak media and distorted information space deepen democratic fragility

A 2025 Japan Times commentary highlighted demographic decline, economic stagnation, security pressures,
and media distortions as a set of interlocking risks to Japan’s democratic stability.

From abroad, Japan increasingly looks like
a country whose information space is structurally prone to distortion.

A 2025 study by Waseda University found that Japanese citizens are
surprisingly vulnerable to authoritarian narratives
propagated by states like Russia and China—conspiracy-like stories and anti-liberal messaging.

Crucially, this vulnerability is not limited to a small extremist fringe;
it appears across society as a whole. This has deeply alarmed many researchers.

These findings underpin a growing view among political scientists that
Japan is moving closer to the Hungarian/Polish pattern of illiberal democracy.

■ 1-3 How Sanae Takaichi changes the picture

International coverage of Takaichi is remarkably consistent. She is typically described as:

• a hardline conservative,
• an ultraconservative or nationalist,
• a hawkish politician.

Specific concerns repeatedly mentioned abroad include:

• her past remark suggesting that broadcasters with “biased” coverage could face suspension,
• her closeness to nationalist and revisionist groups,
• a media environment at risk of becoming too cozy with political power,
• a political dynamic in which emotional, exclusionary rhetoric boosts approval ratings.

Japan already had
a tendency toward media self-censorship, political distrust, and a distorted information space.
On top of that, a leader with a strong illiberal affinity has now taken office.

As a result, many observers now feel that the label

“Japan as a pre-illiberal democracy”

has gained much more credibility than before.

■ 1-4 Not an “accidental crisis,” but a structural trajectory

A key point in overseas analysis is this:
Japan did not suddenly become illiberal because of Takaichi.

Rather, Japan already had:

• widespread dissatisfaction with democracy,
• a media and information space prone to distortion,
• and a public vulnerable to authoritarian narratives.

Takaichi’s rise, in this view, simply gives
a clear direction and face to trends that were already there.

This is why many foreign analysts now describe Japan as:

a country that has moved from “at risk of illiberalism”
to being “effectively on an illiberal trajectory.”

Chapter 2: China, Taiwan and the U.S.–Japan Alliance — Japan as a Frontline State

■ 2-1 Taiwan remarks as a cycle of “domestic politics × regional tension”

In its piece “China Is Overreacting to the Japanese Prime Minister’s Taiwan Remarks,”
TIME portrays Takaichi not just as a hawk, but as
a leader who uses toughness on China for domestic political gain.

After Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan, Beijing:

• restricted or halted imports of Japanese seafood,
• discouraged travel to Japan,
• and ramped up anti-Japan nationalism at home.

TIME’s core argument is that:

Japan uses anti-China toughness to win support at home, while
China uses Japan-bashing to deflect discontent at home.
This mutual use of each other locks the region into chronic tension.

Analysts note that this resembles what happened in Hungary and Poland—
“external enemies” being used to stabilize domestic politics.

■ 2-2 China’s mix of information, economic, and opinion warfare

When China’s Defense Ministry warned that Japan would “pay a painful price” if it crossed certain lines on Taiwan,
foreign experts did not see this as only military signaling.

They instead point to a broader toolbox:

• subtle pressure on Japanese firms and investments,
• information operations via social media and state media,
• calibrated use of trade and tourism as economic levers,
• and limited escalation in the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea.

The Global Taiwan Institute, among others, frames this as
a strategy to weaken U.S.–Japan–Taiwan coordination by raising the cost for Japan.

■ 2-3 The U.S.–Japan alliance: strengthened, or structurally dependent?

Reuters has described Japan under Takaichi as
“the most loyal ally in Asia under a Trump 2.0 scenario.”
This is hardly a straightforward compliment.

Foreign concerns include:

• Japan being treated as the frontline platform in U.S. strategy toward China,
• an expanded Japanese role in any Taiwan contingency,
• insufficiently mature domestic debate in Japan on these high-stakes issues,
• and the reality that Japan—not the U.S.—bears the geographic and economic risks.

A British report that Trump privately told Takaichi “don’t provoke China” reinforces the impression that
Japan is seen more as a subordinate partner to be managed than as a fully autonomous actor.

From abroad, then, it increasingly looks like:
Japan is drifting from “protected ally” toward “frontline state.”
And that shift is happening at a time when Japan’s own democracy is weakening.

Chapter 3: Economy and Public Finances — “A State That Grows Bigger Without Growing Faster”

■ 3-1 Takaichi’s economics as “Abenomics 2.5” plus swelling national projects

International economic coverage (Reuters, FT and others) tends to summarize Takaichi’s economic policy as:

• continued and intensified expansionary fiscal policy,
• large-scale state spending on defense, semiconductors and AI,
• a preference for “money solutions” over structural reforms,
• and a stronger reliance on government bonds.

Japan’s Fiscal System Council has effectively shifted toward a more reflationist stance,
loosening its emphasis on fiscal discipline.
For foreign investors, this is another worrying sign.

In short, the emerging image is:
“bigger government and bigger deficits” are moving ahead—but growth is not.

■ 3-2 Structural problems remain largely untouched

For years, international institutions have highlighted Japan’s long-term risks:

• rapidly shrinking working-age population,
• stagnant productivity,
• political resistance to large-scale immigration,
• slow progress on gender equality and diversity,
• one of the highest public debt ratios in the world,
• and sluggish digital and industrial transformation.

Takaichi’s policies have not fundamentally changed any of these.
If anything, there is a stronger tilt toward
national projects first, structural reform later (if ever).

As one skeptical investor put it:

Japan is becoming a country that papers over problems with national projects instead of solving them.

■ 3-3 The more debt expands, the thinner the growth story becomes

Foreign economic commentary repeatedly stresses several points:

• new government bond issuance is becoming normalized, slowly eroding market confidence,
• defense and industrial subsidies may not translate into sustainable growth,
• fiscal expansion is increasingly driven by political popularity,
• and rising interest rates will eventually raise the cost of debt service.

Put simply:
spending is rising, but the growth story is not getting clearer.
Many analysts see this as a recipe for “long-term stagnation made semi-permanent.”

Chapter 4: Society and Values — An Open Economy with a Closing Mindset

■ 4-1 Culturally ultra-conservative: the consensus foreign view of Takaichi

In the social and cultural realm, foreign media tend to summarize Takaichi’s positions as:

• firm opposition to same-sex marriage,
• opposition to separate family names for married couples,
• a cautious or restrictive stance toward immigration,
• reluctance on gender equality and diversity,
• and a record of statements seen as historically revisionist.

The English edition of Mainichi has warned that a tougher stance on foreigners and immigrants
could increase social friction within Japan.

In short, the foreign consensus is that
“Takaichi’s social values run counter to the direction of Japan’s globalized economy.”

■ 4-2 Countries with closed values tend to lose human capital

International experience suggests that
countries with closed social values struggle to retain or attract top talent.

In Japan, several trends are already visible:

• more young people expressing interest in living or working abroad,
• systemic obstacles to women’s career advancement,
• difficulties in attracting highly skilled foreign workers,
• and foreign investors questioning Japan’s future dynamism.

From abroad, Japan increasingly looks like:

an economy that is open to the world,
coupled with a society whose values are turning inward.

Unless this contradiction is addressed,
many fear that Japan’s growth potential itself will continue to shrink.

Chapter 5: Three Scenarios for Japan’s Future

Bringing together overseas reporting and scholarly work,
Japan’s trajectory under and beyond the Takaichi administration can be grouped into three broad scenarios.

■ Scenario A: A Managed Illiberal Democracy (the most likely)

• elections continue, but freedoms and checks and balances erode,
• media coverage becomes increasingly government-friendly,
• toughness toward China and reliance on the U.S. remain central,
• the economy is kept alive through subsidies and handouts rather than genuine reform,
• citizen participation declines, and political apathy becomes the norm.

In effect, Japan becomes an
“Asian version” of the Hungarian/Polish model.

■ Scenario B: Geopolitically central, economically and normatively peripheral

• Japan remains a key frontline state in U.S.–China rivalry,
• but falls behind in technology, talent, and global norms,
• economic decline is slow but persistent, and reforms remain partial,
• Japan’s international profile becomes narrow and security-centric.

Pessimistic analysts see this as the scenario Japan is already drifting toward.

■ Scenario C: Democratic renewal from below (a small but real source of hope)

There is, however, a more hopeful story emerging at the local level.

• citizens’ assemblies and deliberative mini-publics organized by municipalities,
• local referendums and workshops on energy, climate, and urban planning,
• experiments in “talking politics” beyond party and factional boundaries.

Some foreign researchers now describe Japan as:

a country where democracy is deteriorating at the national level,
but being quietly reinvented at the local level.

In this sense, there is still a narrow opening for
a different future—if these bottom-up experiments can grow.

Conclusion: A Government That Locks In Japan’s Weaknesses

The most accurate one-sentence summary of the overseas view might be this:

The Takaichi administration has not suddenly “turned Japan to the right.”
Rather, it is consolidating structural weaknesses that were already there—
in democracy, the economy, and society.

From this perspective:

• Takaichi represents not so much “change” as “lock-in,”
• Japan is moving from “at risk of illiberalism” to “on an illiberal course,”
• and long-standing weaknesses are finally acquiring a clear shape.

Final Assessment