In Japan today, whenever TV stations or newspapers criticize a particular politician even slightly, a flood of complaints arrives almost instantly.

Coverage of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is a prime example. Even mild criticism triggers a wave of protests, and a mood is spreading inside newsrooms that “it is safer not to touch her at all.”

This is not simply the reaction of “enthusiastic supporters.” In reality, coordinated email barrages and phone attacks are effectively shaping what goes on air — a highly dangerous structure for any democracy.

What makes the situation even worse is that Japan has almost no legal or institutional framework that treats this “politics of volume” as interference with democracy.

This article unpacks the structure of the problem, the institutional weaknesses on the Japanese side, and the contrast with other democracies, in order to understand why Japan has become a country where “democracy is not properly protected.”

1. How Mass Complaints Silence Reporting — The “Politics of Volume” in Japan

In principle, democracy is a system in which different opinions coexist and clash, and through that process the polity becomes more resilient. But in today’s Japan, if you bombard broadcasters with enough complaints, you can effectively shut down critical coverage of certain politicians.

In Europe and the United States, this would be classified as a “coordinated harassment campaign” and treated as a serious threat to democratic debate.

Japanese media, however, are expected to treat

• complaints,
• intimidation, and
• organized pressure

all equally as “voices of viewers and citizens,” answering them with virtually no institutional protection.

As a result, Japan has become a country where “volume tactics” work with maximum effect.

2. How Japanese Institutions Created a Country Where Attacks Work Best

De facto harassment that is rarely treated as obstruction

When large numbers of people repeatedly call or email with the clear intention of forcing program changes, this is substantively very close to obstruction of business.

But in practice:

• If a broadcaster labels it “harassment,” it is immediately accused of “rejecting citizen voices.”
• The Broadcasting Act, in principle, pushes them to “listen to all opinions.”
• There is no legal category that recognizes “coordinated complaint campaigns” as a form of interference.

In other words, attackers are in the safest position, while media outlets are the most vulnerable. That is the structural reality in Japan.

3. Why AI Could Easily Protect Newsrooms — And Why Japan Is Not Using It

From a technological standpoint, AI could filter out the vast majority of these attacks almost instantly:

• Mass emails with identical wording → automatic spam detection and exclusion
• Abnormally frequent calls from the same sources → automatic rerouting or blocking
• Abusive or threatening language → automatic isolation
• Only genuine viewer feedback would be passed on to producers

These tools already exist and are used in other countries.

In Japan, however, broadcasters fear being accused of “rejecting the voices of the public” if they introduce such filters. An outdated interpretation of the Broadcasting Act has become a major barrier.

The result is an abnormal situation in which newsrooms devote enormous resources to handling complaints instead of producing journalism.

4. If Nothing Changes, Only Flattering Coverage Will Remain

For media organizations, the greatest “punishment” is not a lawsuit, but a coordinated flood of complaints. This punishment is not just a matter of numbers:

• it exhausts frontline staff,
• it makes management risk-averse, and
• it pressures editors to avoid controversial topics.

This quickly hardens into a pattern:

• Critical reporting → complaints → self-censorship
• Soft or flattering coverage → no complaints → more of the same

In this way, the media gradually distances itself from its core role of “monitoring those in power.”

This is exactly how public information spaces become impoverished and democratic checks and balances are weakened.

5. Why Foreign Media Are Freer to Criticize Governments than Their Japanese Counterparts

In many democracies, the freedom of the press is supported by a three-layered structure: law, professional psychology, and political culture.

(1) Law: Strong Legal Protections for Media Independence

In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution explicitly prohibits government interference with the press. If the White House tried to organize pressure against a broadcaster, that itself could become a constitutional scandal.

In the United Kingdom, the BBC is institutionally independent from the government. Robust criticism of the prime minister is an expected part of its mission, and if a prime minister publicly complained about BBC coverage, they would likely be criticized for trying to interfere.

In the EU, freedom and independence of the media are treated as public goods and backed by specific regulations, such as the European Media Freedom Act.

Japan, by contrast:

• has Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act, which is often used as a pretext for political pressure in the name of “fairness,”
• lacks strong legal safeguards for media independence, and
• has no clear framework for regulating coordinated complaint campaigns.

Institutionally, Japan is one of the least protected environments for critical journalism in advanced democracies.

(2) Professional Psychology: “Criticizing Power Is Our Job”

In many Western newsrooms, journalists share a professional ethic that “monitoring those in power is our raison d’être.”

Being attacked by politicians or supporters is often seen as proof that they are doing their job. Pressure from above can even be worn as a badge of honor.

In Japan, by contrast:

• complaint campaigns can quickly turn into personal harassment of individual producers and reporters,
• psychological burdens on staff are heavy, and
• management often urges them to “avoid trouble and keep things calm.”

This professional environment naturally discourages strong critical reporting.

(3) Political Culture: “Culture of Critique” vs. “Culture of Conformity”

In many Western societies, political culture accepts — and even expects:

• sharp criticism,
• public argument, and
• open disagreement.

In Japan, on the other hand:

• people are expected to “read the room,”
• avoid “rocking the boat,”
• criticism is easily interpreted as hostility, and
• those who criticize power are quickly labeled and stigmatized.

This strong culture of conformity directly feeds into newsroom self-censorship.

6. Structural Differences in Summary

In other democracies

• Law protects media independence.
• Journalistic ethics emphasize monitoring power.
• Criticism and debate are culturally accepted.
• Coordinated complaint campaigns can be treated as spam or harassment.
• Political interference with media often becomes a scandal.

In Japan

• Law does little to protect media from political pressure.
• There is no clear regulation of coordinated complaint attacks.
• “Atmosphere” and “self-protection” dominate newsroom decisions.
• Critical coverage is easily chilled.
• Political pressure on media has become normalized.
• Coordinated complaints are among the most effective tools of informal censorship.

7. What Japan Actually Needs: AI Shields and Institutional Reform

(1) Laws Regulating Coordinated Harassment Campaigns

Japan urgently needs legal frameworks that recognize political mass-complaint campaigns and abusive call barrages as forms of interference with democratic debate.

Similar discussions are already underway in parts of Europe and North America. Japan is simply lagging behind.

(2) AI-Based Protection Inside Broadcasters

• filter out identical complaint texts automatically,
• isolate abnormally frequent calls,
• block abusive or threatening messages, and
• deliver only genuine, civil viewer feedback to program staff.

Introducing such systems would go a long way toward restoring editorial independence and protecting journalists from burnout.

8. Conclusion: Japan’s Democracy Is Not Protected by Law, Culture, or Mindset

What we are seeing in Japan is a form of “silent censorship by volume.”

Media outlets can be attacked with almost no protection. Legal safeguards are weak. The cultural and psychological environment encourages self-censorship rather than resilience.

That is precisely why talking openly about this problem is, in itself, an act of defending democracy.

9. Before an Anti-Spy Law, There Is Something More Urgent

One more point needs to be made: before rushing to enact a sweeping anti-spy law, Japan should first fix its own information space.

In many cases, foreign “influence operations” do not take the form of dramatic espionage, but rather of quietly encouraging polarization, silencing, or confusion in domestic debate.

That is why:

• regulating coordinated complaint attacks,
• introducing AI-based protections in media organizations, and
• strengthening legal safeguards for editorial independence

are in fact the front line of defense against foreign interference.

If the information space is unhealthy, no matter how strict an anti-spy law may be, democracy can still be eroded from within.

What Japan needs to prioritize is not simply “protecting the state,” but building robust mechanisms to protect citizens’ right to know.

References

Japan

• Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (n.d.). Broadcasting Act (Act No. 132 of 1950). https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/325AC0000000132
• Mainichi Shimbun. (2025, September 2). Considering Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act 75 years after its enactment. https://mainichi.jp/articles/20250902/ddm/004/040/005000c
• Japan Federation of Bar Associations. (1999). Resolution on news reporting and the prevention and relief of damage caused by reporting. https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/document/civil_liberties/year/1999/1999_3.html
• Tohoku University. (n.d.). Freedom of the press and media ethics [PDF]. https://www2.econ.tohoku.ac.jp/~takaura/19tajima.pdf

Law and Official Documents (Abroad)

• United States Congress. (n.d.). First Amendment to the United States Constitution. https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/
• BBC. (2017). Royal Charter for the Continuance of the British Broadcasting Corporation. https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter.pdf
• European Union. (2024). European Media Freedom Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1083). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng

Press Freedom Reports and Surveys

• Reporters Without Borders. (2025). Global press freedom at unprecedented, critical low. https://gijn.org/stories/global-press-freedom-at-unprecedented-critical-low-reporters-without-borders/
• Media Freedom Coalition. (2024). Why media freedom matters [PDF]. https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/MFC-Final-Report.pdf
• Pew Research Center. (2025, April). Free expression seen as important globally. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/04/24/free-expression-seen-as-important-globally-but-not-everyone-thinks-their-country-has-press-speech-and-internet-freedoms/
• Council of Europe. (2024). Media Freedom Reports. https://aej-uk.org/media-freedom/coe-media-freedom-reports/
• Committee to Protect Journalists. (n.d.). CPJ database on press freedom. https://cpj.org/

Note: This article includes the author’s analysis and opinions (Opinion) based on publicly available information, institutional analysis, and international comparisons.